Abstract: Sartre's phenomenological view of consciousness gives primacy to the thesis that all consciousness is nonthetically aware of itself, i. e. pre-reflectively aware of itself but not as an object. Few commentators, however, have explained Sartre's grounds for holding this thesis, despite his view that the thesis's truth underwrites the certainty of the Cartesian cogito and thereby the method of Sartre's own phenomenological ontology. I document three lines of support for the thesis, the most promising of which consists in a proof by cases. Namely, Sartre's texts contain the argument that the existence of nonthetic consciousness is the only satisfactory explanation of the Cartesian cogito's certainty. The paper concludes with an examination of whether and how nonthetic consciousness can serve as a foundation for Sartre's method of phenomenological ontology.
Introduction
Sartre's phenomenological view of consciousness is distinctive in giving primacy to the thesis that all consciousness is nonthetically aware of itself, i. e. aware of itself but not as an object. Few commentators, however, have explained Sartre's grounds for holding this thesis.1 In this paper, I canvass Sartre's three lines of support for the thesis, and I show that one of these lines of support, although entirely neglected by Sartre scholars, is of crucial methodological importance for Sartre's phenomenological ontology.
In Section 2, I present Sartre's phenomenological views that are a requisite background for understanding the thesis. In Section 3, I present the two most prominent lines of support for the thesis. Both are found in Being and Nothingness, but despite the maturity of that text, I suggest that these two lines of support are unsatisfactory.
Nevertheless, Being and Nothingness refers to a third line of support that Sartre had developed in his earlier phenomenological works. The bulk of this paper presents this third line of support, as it is of special interest insofar as it is meant to ground the method by which Sartre presents his phenomenological ontology. In Section 4, I explain the methodological need for Sartre to account for the ground of the Cartesian cogito's certainty. In Section 5, I present an argument implicit in Sartre's early phenomenological texts that addresses this methodological need; namely, an argument that the Cartesian cogito's certainty is grounded on the nonthetic consciousness that accompanies all consciousness. I provide evidence that Sartre's early works provide the details for such an argument, and we can construe this argument as a proof by cases. For there seem to be only four alternatives for solving the problem of explaining the Cartesian cogito's certainty. One option is easily rejected. But two other options were quite live at Sartre's time, as they had representatives under the guise of Husserl's transcendental ego and Freud's unconscious. Sartre's early texts contain overlooked arguments for why neither can account for the Cartesian cogito's certainty. This proof by cases presents Sartre's most extensive line of support for holding that all consciousness is nonthetically conscious of itself.
In Section 6, I evaluate Sartre's argument by focusing specifically on whether it can successfully address Sartre's own methodological needs. Sartre's argument is supposed to provide a firm foundation for making ontological claims, but this argument itself relies on some bold ontological assumptions. I suggest that this circularity need not be vicious, as there is good reason not to take Sartre to be a foundationalist when it comes to constructing a philosophical system. In Section 7, I conclude by considering some further questions concerning Sartre's method, and I offer some suggestions about how nonthetic consciousness might make pure reflection possible.
Background Phenomenological Terminology and Views
In this section, I present the phenomenological views and terminology that are requisite for understanding Sartre's case for nonthetic consciousness.
The Doctrine of Intentionality
The foundational assumption of Sartre's phenomenology is the doctrine of intentionality, which holds that every consciousness is consciousness of something, i. e. every consciousness has an object.2 Thus, whether I think, doubt, imagine, or perceive, each such act will always be of something. Sartre calls consciousness "positional" or "thetic" when he wants to characterize it as fulfilling the doctrine of intentionality. Accordingly, the doctrine of intentionality can be formulated as the claim that every consciousness is positional or thetic.
Nonthetic Consciousness and Reflection
Although committed to the doctrine of intentionality, Sartre holds that a description of consciousness as positional is incomplete. This is because he also holds what I shall call the thesis of nonthetic consciousness: every consciousness is nonpositionally or nonthetically aware of itself.3 What makes consciousness's awareness of itself nonthetic is that it is aware of itself not as an object, but rather as something like an activity or perspective that consciousness takes on ob-jects.4 It might seem paradoxical to say that every consciousness is both thetic and nonthetic. But we should not be misled by this terminology. All that Sartre means is that every consciousness has two aspects, one thetic and the other nonthetic.5
Nonthetic consciousness must not be confused with reflection. Sartre uses "reflection" in a technical sense. For Sartre, "reflection" refers to a consciousness that takes another consciousness as its object.6 This characteristically takes the form of a consciousness that has "I" as its grammatical subject, e. g. "I think there's a tree".7 Here we have a first-order reflected consciousness -"there's a tree" -and a second-order reflecting consciousness -"I think there's a tree".8 Hence, nonthetic consciousness and reflection must not be equated. Whereas consciousness's nonthetic awareness of itself does not involve positing consciousness as an object, reflection requires that the thetic aspect of consciousness has consciousness as an object.9
It is less clear how ZB § 39 might indicate something akin to nonthetic consciousness. Perhaps it hints at nonthetic consciousness with its notions of "primal sensations", "pre-phenomenal, pre-immanent temporality", and "the self-appearance of the flux". Despite the suggestiveness of the above passages from Husserl's lectures on Inner Time Consciousness, there is nothing that suggests any view about self-consciousness. On this basis, I suggest that Sartre mentioned the wrong work of Husserl's. In the Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl explicitly discusses transcendental subjectivity or self-consciousness (FTL § 103), and he sketches how it makes possible the reflective science of phenomenology (FTL § 104). And Sartre's possible confusion of this discussion with ZB could be explained by FTL's nearby discussion of "internal experience" and "consciousness of internal time" (FTL § 107). The role of "internal perception" is highlighted as well in Emmanuel Levinas's The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Philosophy:
The specific mode of existence of consciousness -its absoluteness and its independence from reflection -consists in its existing for itself, prior to being taken in any way as an object by reflection. Consciousness exists in such a way that it is constantly present to itself [présente à elle-même] . (TIHP 30, my emphasis) This passage from Levinas is particularly striking because Sartre explicates nonthetic consciousness in terms similar to "presence to self" 6 TE 44 f./ [27] [28] [29] BN 12/19, 212/197; and CSKS 121 . 7 I describe reflection in grammatical terms only as an aid to understanding. Sartre himself isn't interested in the grammar or logic of the cogito (TB 364). Moreover, Sartre states that not all instances in which the I is present count as reflection (TE 89 f./70-72). 8 Unfortunately, there are some translation issues here. In using "reflection", "reflecting", and "reflected", I refer to "réflexion" in the sense derived from "réfléchir", rather than the sense derived from "refléter" (see Barnes's footnote on page 213 of Being and Nothingness). Thus, in what follows, "reflecting" substitutes for "réfléchissant" (rather than "reflétant") and "reflected" substitutes for "réfléchi" (rather than "reflet"). Accordingly, I have silently modified Barnes's translation in places, e. g. when she has "the consciousness reflected-on" for "la conscience réflé-chie", I instead formulate this as "the reflected consciousness". 9 Note, however, that since every consciousness is nonthetically aware of itself, even reflecting consciousness is aware of itself nonthetically. So, the consciousness "I think there's a tree" is nonthetically aware of itself, i. e. aware of itself as positing the I as thinking there is a tree.
Two Lines of Support for Nonthetic Consciousness
Being and Nothingness presents two prominent lines of support for the thesis of nonthetic consciousness. In this section, I outline both of these and show why each is unsatisfactory. But Being and Nothingness refers us to a third line of support, which will be the concern of the remainder of the paper.
Phenomenological Illustration
Sartre sometimes offers phenomenological illustrations that are intended to guide his readers in recognizing that all consciousness has a nonthetic side or aspect. This occurs most notably in Being and Nothingness's famous example of counting cigarettes (13/19 f.), but it also occurs in Transcendence of the .
In the former example, we are supposed to consider a consciousness of counting cigarettes that posits only the cigarettes and their objective properties, but does not posit a subject as performing this act of counting. Even though there is no thetic or positional consciousness of a subject or I performing the activity of counting, Sartre expects us to recognize that there is nevertheless "a non-thetic consciousness of [one's] adding activity" (BN 13/19). Sartre seems aware that this might not be obvious, so he enjoins the reader to entertain an imaginative variation of how the example might proceed:
If anyone questioned me, indeed, if anyone should ask, "What are you doing there" I should reply at once, "I am counting." This reply aims not only at the instantaneous consciousness which I can achieve by reflection but at those fleeting consciousnesses which have passed without being reflected [réfléchies], those which are forever unreflected [irréfléchies] in my immediate past. (BN 13/19 f.) This example suggests that if one is conscious of something (e. g. counting cigarettes), then it is always possible (given a sufficient motivation such as another person's questioning) to reflect on that consciousness. But the condition for the possibility of such reflection, and hence of the original consciousness, is nonthetic consciousness: "the non-thetic consciousness of counting […] is the very condition of my act of adding" (BN 13/20). The secondary literature often appeals to the cigarette-counting example or similar considerations to explain Sartre's conception of nonthetic consciousness or even Sartre's reasons for holding the thesis that all consciousness is nonthe-tic.10 But this approach is too limited. First, the illustration doesn't provide strong enough reason to think either that nonthetic consciousness is essential to all consciousness or that it guarantees the possibility of reflection. As we shall see, other explanations of reflection were available at Sartre's time. Furthermore, focusing on the cigarette-counting example is misleading because Sartre presents it only after already having given an argument for the thesis of nonthetic consciousness . This suggests that the example ought not to be understood as sufficient for establishing the thesis; rather, it is better understood as a phenomenological illustration of a result already arrived at through earlier argumentation. Let us now turn to that argumentation.
Transcendental Argument from the Assumption of Knowledge
This earlier argumentation for the thesis of nonthetic consciousness occurs within a more ambitious argument whose conclusion is "that we must abandon the primacy of knowledge if we wish to establish that knowledge" (BN 10 f./17). Unfortunately, Sartre does not give an explicit characterization of what he means by either "knowledge" or "the primacy of knowledge". With regard to the former, I suggest that Sartre's use of the term "knowledge" [connaissance] here follows Levinas's characterization of the type of knowledge [connaissance] that is the concern of epistemology: knowledge is the "contact" between an object and a subject.11 I suggest further that, for Sartre, someone who accepts the primacy of knowledge attempts, on the assumption that we have knowledge in this sense, to answer traditional philosophical problems by investigating the nature of knowledge and its conditions.12 In approaching this argument, then, one must keep in mind that Sartre's target is someone who accepts the primacy of knowledge. Sartre's strategy against 10 See, for example, Catalano 1974, 32; Jeanson 1980, 114; Manser 1966, 49-53; Onof 2013, 37; Rowlands 2011, 178 f.; and Wider 1989, 330-332. Exceptions to this are Gardner 2009, 44-49 who focuses on the argument I present in the next section - Morris 1976, 30-35 -who appeals mostly to Transcendence of the Ego -Grene 1973 , 117-124 -discussed below -and Wider 1989 and 1993 appeals to Sartre's discussion of bad faith. 11 TIHP 25. 12 It might seem (particularly at BN 10/16 f.) that the primacy of knowledge just amounts to an adherence to the phenomenalist position that esse est percipi. I suggest, however, that Sartre begins with this phenomenalist position simply because it is the epistemological approach with the fewest ontological commitments. this target is to provide a transcendental argument: he first grants the assumption that we have knowledge -an assumption that would be acceptable to someone advocating the primacy of knowledge -and he then attempts to show that knowledge is possible only if particular ontological conditions are met. Namely, the necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge, Sartre argues, are beingfor-itself and being-in-itself. If Sartre's overall argument here is sound, we ought thus to favor ontology over epistemology -i. e. favor the primacy of being over the primacy of knowledge -as the starting point of systematic philosophy, even if we accept the assumption that we have knowledge. We are concerned here, however, only with the portion of this argument that shows that being-for-itself, insofar as nonthetic consciousness constitutes its very being, is a necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge. I shall now outline this argument as proceeding in four steps.
On the assumption that we have knowledge, Sartre's first step is to argue that "knowledge refers to consciousness" (BN 10/17) . This is so simply on the grounds that knowledge requires both a known and a knowing, the latter amounting to consciousness. Sartre's second step is to clarify the nature of this consciousness: namely, consciousness is to be understood, following Husserl, as intentional (BN 11/17). Sartre does not offer any independent grounds for this, presumably because of his fundamental commitment to phenomenology. But whereas Husserl's phenomenological method begins by "bracketing" the existence of everything, Sartre's approach leads quite quickly to ontological claims, as the further steps of his argument illustrate.
So far, the first two steps have shown that knowledge requires consciousness and that "all knowing consciousness can be knowledge only of its object" (BN 11/18) . The third step is the following subargument:
However, the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its object, is that it be consciousness of itself as being that knowledge. This is a ne ces sary condition, for if my consciousness were not consciousness of being consciousness of the table, it would then be consciousness of that table without consciousness of being so. In other words, it would be a consciousness ignorant of itself, an unconscious -which is absurd. This is a sufficient condition, for my being conscious of being conscious of that table suffices in fact for me to be conscious of it. That is of course not sufficient to permit me to affirm that this table exists in itself -but rather that it exists for me. (BN 11/18) In this passage, Sartre attempts to show that a necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge is that knowing consciousness "be conscious of itself as being that knowledge". The claim that this self-consciousness suffices for knowledge is plausible enough -at least if we suppose that Sartre is using "knowledge" in the sense Levinas describes -but not of great importance for Sartre's broader argu-ment. This is because the remainder of Sartre's argument relies only on the claim that some form of self-consciousness is a necessary condition for knowledge.
Sartre's argument for this claim is that if self-consciousness were not a ne cessary condition for knowledge, we would be committed to the absurdity of "a consciousness ignorant of itself" or "an unconscious". Sartre has many attacks on the unconscious, most of which attempt to show that the very notion of an unconscious is contradictory. Even if those attacks are persuasive, Sartre's argumentative move here, as Marjorie Grene points out, seems too quick.13 For Sartre's primary characterization of consciousness so far is that it is intentional, and it does not seem contradictory for consciousness to be simultaneously aware of an object and not aware of itself. Likewise, Grene advances the further perceptive objection that even if something akin to nonthetic consciousness is required for knowledge, Sartre has not provided sufficient grounds for showing that this nonthetic consciousness must be a form of self-consciousness.14 She diagnoses this error as due to Sartre taking the cogito "as the unique and indispensable starting point of all philosophy", and such a Cartesian starting point, she further argues, is a mistake.15
Although I agree with Grene both that Sartre's Cartesianism is at play in the present argument and that this argument on its own is unpersuasive, I show later in this paper how this implicit Cartesianism is tied up with a much more nuanced argument for nonthetic consciousness. Let it suffice at present to respond to Grene's charge by recalling the rhetorical context of the present argument. Sartre's target here is the prevalent adherence to the primacy of knowledge, the attempt to answer traditional philosophical problems by beginning with a theory of knowledge. It further seems that Sartre's paradigm here includes philosophers who approach those problems from a first-personal standpoint -such as Descartes, Berkeley, and Kant. Since such philosophers have a first-personal starting point, they would have to be committed to there being some form of self-awareness to make possible their own philosophical claims. Thus, in addressing this target, Sartre legitimately takes his interlocutor as admitting some form of self-consciousness, whether it be expressed by the cogito or by Kant's "I think" that must be able to accompany all one's representations. Given this rhetorical context, Sartre need not address scientists, psychologists, or recent epistemological externalists not committed to the primacy of knowledge in the sense described. Hence, within this rhetorical context, there is no need for Sartre to offer these parties a detailed defense of why self-consciousness is required for knowledge. In any case, the resulting claim of Sartre's third step is that self-consciousness of some sort ("being conscious of being conscious" of something) is a necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge.
The fourth step is an argument against the view -which might be tempting for adherents to the primacy of knowledge -that this consciousness of consciousness is to be understood as a form of reflection (BN 11 f./18 f.).16 Sartre notes that if one attempts to use reflection to explain the self-consciousness required for knowledge, then since the reflecting consciousness is itself consciousness, either this reflecting consciousness is self-consciousness or it requires a further act of reflection for self-consciousness. This account is thus led to "stop at any one term of the series" or to "affirm the necessity of an infinite regress" (BN 12/19). The former is unacceptable because the reflecting consciousness stopped at is either self-conscious or not: in either case we would still need an explanation of self-consciousness. The latter affirmation of an infinite regress is "absurd", presumably because such an infinite regress would likewise fail to explain what makes consciousness self-aware. Thus, Sartre rejects that self-consciousness, which is required for the possibility of knowledge, is founded on an act of reflection.17
The last conclusion seems to rule out the possibility that any thetic or positional consciousness could ever account for the self-awareness required for knowledge, since it seems that the only thetic consciousness that could do this would be reflection. Thus, Sartre infers that "there must be an immediate, non-cognitive relation of the self to itself" (BN 12/19) or, in other words, that "every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself" (BN 13/19) . Note that this last statement, which concludes Sartre's argumentation, comes right before the example of counting cigarettes. This is why I suggested earlier that the use of that example is supposed to provide a phenomenological illustration to support Sartre's thesis, rather than an argument for the thesis.
Recall that Sartre's conclusion is reached on the basis of the assumption that we have knowledge, an assumption agreeable to an adherent of the primacy of 16 Cf. Husserl's arguments that neither "primal consciousness" (ZB Appendix IX) nor "internal consciousness" (ZB Appendix XII) can be explained, on pain of infinite regress, by reflection. Furthermore, perhaps both the third and the fourth steps of Sartre's argument follow Husserl's view that "insoluble difficulties" arise if one tries to understand primal consciousness in terms of either reflection or an unconscious (ZB Appendix IX). 17 A particularly lucid explanation for why reflection cannot account for self-awareness is offered in Zahavi 2003, 159. knowledge. Accordingly, to put Sartre's conclusion more precisely: knowledge is possible only if all consciousness is nonthetically aware of itself. Sartre understands the thesis of nonthetic consciousness to be ontological -specifying the type of being that consciousness is -and he uses it as a foundation for asserting further ontological claims. If successful, this line of argumentation would thus undercut the view that knowledge is primary.18
But let us limit our focus here to evaluating Sartre's support for the thesis of nonthetic consciousness. Sartre's second line of support begins with the assumption that we have knowledge in a sense accepted by those who advocate the primacy of knowledge. There are two inadequacies with this approach. First, it means Sartre's argument gains purchase only on those who accept something akin to an internalist view about knowledge. Hence, the argument would not be persuasive to three groups: (1) philosophers who don't accept the primacy of knowledge, e. g. in Sartre's own time, Heidegger; (2) psychologists who accept the unconscious; and, (3) externalists who deny that knowledge requires that one knows that one knows. Second, since Sartre himself does not accept the primacy of knowledge, it is legitimate to ask what grounds -independent of explaining what makes knowledge possible -he has for the thesis of nonthetic consciousness. In the remainder of this paper, I show that Sartre has such independent grounds, which are bound up with an important methodological problem for Sartre's phenomenological ontology.
Nevertheless, this remark suggests another line of support for nonthetic consciousness. Roughly put: if what Sartre understands by "the Cartesian cogito" is in some way essential to consciousness, and if nonthetic consciousness is essential for making the Cartesian cogito possible, then nonthetic consciousness is essential to consciousness too. Indeed, we have good evidence that in his early works Sartre was preoccupied with explanations of the Cartesian cogito's certainty. We find explicit arguments against explanations of it that appeal either to Husserl's transcendental ego or to the Freudian unconscious (E 45 f.). Such passages taken together, as I shall argue, can be understood as offering an argument for the thesis of nonthetic consciousness. And this argument is of great interest for understanding and evaluating Sartre's use of a phenomenological method to advance ontological claims.
Before we approach this third line of support in Section 5, I explain in this section what Sartre means by the expression "Cartesian cogito" and why there is a methodological need to explain the Cartesian cogito's certainty.
The Cartesian Cogito
In his early work The Imaginary, Sartre assumes that it is essential for every consciousness that it can perform the cogito: "It is […] absurd […] to conceive of a consciousness that cannot effect the cogito" (IY 188).19 But we must be on guard whenever Sartre refers to the cogito because sometimes he draws a distinction between what he calls the "Cartesian cogito" and the "pre-reflective cogito". Whereas the "Cartesian cogito" is reflective insofar as it posits the I, the "pre-reflective cogito" is equivalent to nonthetic consciousness.20 So in claiming that 19 Cf. NE 309. This echoes Kant's famous assertion in the B-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that "[t]he I think must be able to accompany all my representations" (B131). At the beginning of Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre states that "it is necessary to concede [accorder]" this assertion (32/13). Likewise, both Husserl (Ideen § 57) and Levinas (TIHP 50) quote Kant's dictum with approval (note that the English translation of Levinas's book omits the crucial verb "pouvoir" in Levinas's original text). To this extent Sartre follows them. But Sartre goes on in Transcendence to explain why the actual existence of the "I think", in addition to its validity, needs to be investigated . 20 BN 13/20 and CSKS 114 f. I take it that "pre-reflective cogito", "nonpositional consciousness", and "nonthetic consciousness" are all equivalent. I suggest that Sartre uses the phrase "pre-reflective cogito" to refer to nonpositional or nonthetic consciousness insofar as it is taken as grounding the certainty of the Cartesian cogito. Sartre's introduction of the phrase "pre-reflective cogito" likely stems from taking his predecessors to use the term "cogito" to refer to instances of every consciousness must be able to perform the cogito, which of these two does he mean?
Recall that Sartre's thesis of nonthetic consciousness holds that every consciousness must be nonthetically conscious of itself. Since the pre-reflective cogito amounts to nonthetic consciousness, it might seem that we could take Sartre's claim from The Imaginary as meaning only that it is absurd to conceive of a consciousness that is not nonthetically aware of itself. Sartre does in fact hold that view, but we have two reasons for thinking that Sartre's claim in The Im aginary refers to the Cartesian cogito. First, in that work, Sartre never draws the distinction between the two types of cogito, and, second, all the other mentions of the cogito in that work are best interpreted as referring to the Cartesian cogito.21 Thus, there is good evidence that the thesis advanced in The Imaginary is that it is essential for every consciousness that it be able to perform the Cartesian cogito.
Understanding this claim is important and requires getting clearer on Sartre's somewhat idiosyncratic understanding of the Cartesian cogito. He sometimes gives the impression that the Cartesian cogito is merely "I think".22 But the doctrine of intentionality entails that "I think" cannot by itself be a genuine instance of consciousness because it lacks an object. Therefore, when Sartre writes of the Cartesian cogito, he has in mind specifications of such a thought: "if one doubts, he doubts something".23 In moving forward, let us use the following as an example of the Cartesian cogito: "I perceive there's a tree".24
Sartre claims that since the Cartesian cogito is reflective, it requires "a synthesis of two consciousnesses, one of which is conscious of the other" (TE 44/28). In our example, one consciousness is "there's a tree" and the second consciousness takes the first as its object: "I perceive there's a tree". But if such an instance of the Cartesian cogito is to be certain, then according to Sartre it must be because "there is an indissoluble unity between the reflecting consciousness and the reflected consciousness" (TE 44/28).25 That is, there must be something uniting reflection. This is suggested in Husserl's Ideen § 57: "In reflexion every cogitatio on being carried out takes the explicit form cogito." 21 IY 148, 156, 160, 180, 186. 22 Cf. BN 119/115, 133/127; and, CSKS 115, 117, 121 . 23 CSKS 116; cf. IY 160 f. In this, Sartre follows Husserl; see, for example, CM § 14, § 16 and especially Ideen § 36: "It belongs as a general feature to the essence of every actual cogito to be a consciousness of something." 24 Note that the consciousness reflected on need not be propositional. For example, "I think (of a) tree" could work just as well. 25 Cf. CSKS 126.
"there's a tree" and "I perceive there's a tree", and this union must be "indis soluble" in order to guarantee certainty.
But what exactly is certain with respect to the Cartesian cogito? Sartre never makes this clear. Sometimes he seems to suggest that it is merely a certainty that consciousness exists.26 But he sometimes suggests that it is a certainty both of the manner in which one is conscious as well as of what it is one is conscious of.27 That is, if I perform the Cartesian cogito and reflect "I perceive there's a tree", I can be mistaken neither in taking myself to be perceiving (as opposed to, for example, imagining or conceiving) the tree, nor in taking myself to be aware of a tree (as opposed to, for example, a chair or a book).
A Question about the Cartesian Cogito's Certainty
I now outline why Sartre takes there to be a question about what explains the Cartesian cogito's certainty. In the next subsection, I explain why there's a methodological need for Sartre to answer this question.
In one way, the two consciousnesses in the Cartesian cogito -the reflecting consciousness and the reflected consciousness -seem to be distinct consciousnesses, since they have different intentional objects.28 But in another way, they must be "homologous" (BN 121/117) if the Cartesian cogito is to be certain in the ways just outlined. Therefore, the Cartesian cogito's certainty requires the sameness of two consciousnesses that are at the same time distinct in virtue of having different objects. This line of thought is gestured at in Being and Nothingness with a discussion that leads to the conclusion that "it is necessary that the reflective [le réflexif] simultaneously be and not be the reflected [réfléchi]" (BN 213 f./198).
One might think that the Cartesian cogito has certainty solely in virtue of its being an act of reflection. But this won't work because Sartre recognizes two kinds of reflection: whereas "pure reflection" enjoys certainty, "impure reflection" lacks it (and is much more common).29 Thus, the reflective nature of the Car-26 TE 53 f./37 and IY 160 f.; cf. EM 11. 27 See BN 14/20 f. and NM 249 f. 28 "[T]he consciousness which says I Think is precisely not the consciousness which thinks" (TE 45/28). 29 Pure reflection is "the simple presence of the reflective for-itself to the for-itself reflected-on, is at once the original form of reflection and its ideal form; it is that on whose foundation impure reflection appears, it is that also which is never first given; and it is that which must be won by a sort of katharsis" (BN 218/201). For additional characterizations of pure reflection, see BN 221/204 f., 224/206 f. Impure reflection "includes pure reflection but surpasses it and makes fur-tesian cogito cannot account for its certainty. So, the question that can be posed is: what accounts for the Cartesian cogito's certainty?30
A Methodological Need to Answer the Question
I have just outlined why we can pose a question about the Cartesian cogito's certainty. But now I want to explain why Sartre ought to have addressed this question, due to a pressing need for him to have a solid method for the phenomenological ontology presented in Being and Nothingness.
Sartre begins the chapter "Immediate Structures of the For-Itself" of Being and Nothingness by summarizing how his previous investigations of negation, freedom, and bad faith led to the "the being of consciousness" (BN 119/115), namely that it "is a being such that in its being, its being is in question" (BN 120/116).31 He then states that the subsequent investigations must pick up from Being and Nothingness's introduction, namely by returning "to the plane of the pre-reflective cogito" (BN 119/115). Hence, "the cogito must be our point of departure" for the remaining investigations of Being and Nothingness (BN 120/116).32
But there is an inherent difficulty here: since Sartre's investigations describe being-for-itself, i. e. consciousness, this means that his own claims concerning consciousness count as reflection on his own definition. Sartre himself recognizes this fact when he asks the following: "since all our ontology has its foundation in ther claims", and these further claims undermine the certainty of the pure reflection on which it is based (BN 218/201). The claim that reflection cannot account for the certainty of the Cartesian cogito or pure reflection is made in many other places. See BN 12/18 f. and 213/197 f. 30 The precise nature of pure reflection, whose importance is widely acknowledged in the secondary literature, is up for debate. See Anderson 1993, 52-56; Gardner 2009, 190-192; Kenevan 1981 , Morelli 2008 , Vaughan 1993 , Zheng 2001 , and Zheng 2005 . My main purpose here is to make clear Sartre's argument for nonthetic consciousness, and I hope that on the basis of this work, further research will be fruitful in uncovering how exactly nonpositional consciousness is supposed to ground pure reflection. See my concluding suggestions below in Section 7. 31 This description of the being of consciousness also seems equivalent to the description that consciousness "be what it is not and not be what it is" (BN 120/116). 32 Sartre explains later (BN 126/121) why his investigations in Being and Nothingness had to begin, not with the cogito itself, but rather with a pattern of conduct as a "guiding thread" (BN 34/38) or "conducting thread" (BN 126/121) for finding or disclosing nothingness. Nevertheless, throughout many of his writings Sartre maintains the need to begin with the cogito (TB 368; EH 40 f.; CSKS 114 f.; SB 92-94, 102-105). a reflective experience, does it not risk losing all its rights?" (BN 212/197) .33 That is, if we cannot account for how some reflection, namely pure reflection, can have "certitude" or "apodicticity", then the prospects of producing a true phenomenological ontology are dim.
The methodological problem for Sartre, then, is to determine what gives pure reflection its certainty, and he must base his own reflective descriptions in Being and Nothingness on whatever it is that provides this certainty.34 In Sartre's terms, there is a need to account for [the reflective consciousness's (la conscience réflexive)] absolute unity with the reflected consciousness [la conscience réfléchie], a unity which alone renders conceivable the rights and the certainty of the reflective intuition. (BN 212/197) Surrounding this remark are arguments explaining why reflection by itself cannot account for the "absolute unity" that is sought, which is presumably equivalent to the "indissoluble unity" mentioned earlier.
Sartre goes on to give an example to illustrate what is at issue. He entertains the objection that an explanation is needed for how reflection, while sometimes apodictic or certain, can nevertheless sometimes make errors with respect to the past (BN 221/204). This is a problem for Sartre because his own phenomenological ontology, which consists of reflective descriptions, puts forth claims about the past. The objection can be formulated more generally: given that phenomenology is usually a reflective endeavor, and given that Sartre himself must take others' phenomenological theories to be uncertain (if not just plain false), how can we be assured that Sartre's own philosophical reflections are certain?
Sartre answers the objection with respect to the past by appealing to the distinction between a nonthetic consciousness of the past and a thetic memory of one's past (BN 221/204) .35 This suggests that, more generally, Sartre's phenomenological and ontological reflections acquire their certainty in virtue of nonthetic consciousness. Indeed, he makes this clear in several passages, the most explicit of which is contained in the lecture "Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of Self": 33 I have modified Barnes's translation: for "ses droits", I have translated "its rights" instead of "its laws". This is because the worry expressed here concerns the legitimacy of phenomenological ontology, and we should not here confuse Sartre's talk of rights [droits] with his talk elsewhere of laws [lois] . 34 Yiwei Zheng 2001, 28 , has also noted the methodological importance of pure reflection, as well as its relation to nonpositional consciousness. Also of note in connection with this is the methodological reading of Transcendence of the Ego in Bergoffen 1978. 35 For more on this distinction, cf. TE 46-49/30-32.
Only the pre-reflective "cogito" establishes the rights of the reflective "cogito" and of reflection. (CSKS 114, my emphasis)36 In the next section, I take this thought as a guiding thread for understanding a third line of support that Sartre gives for holding the thesis that all consciousness is nonthetically aware of itself.
Sartre's Argument
To present an argument for Sartre's thesis that every consciousness is nonthetically conscious of itself, I cannot appeal to any one text.37 But I shall reconstruct an argument that is implicit in Sartre's early writings. In outline, the argument runs as follows. As we saw earlier, Sartre assumes that it is essential to every consciousness that it can perform the Cartesian cogito. Thus, whatever ensures the Cartesian cogito's certainty is essential to every consciousness. But there are only four options for what guarantees its certainty. First, what guarantees the Cartesian cogito's certainty must be either (I) an object; or, (II) consciousness.
If it is (I), an object that guarantees the Cartesian cogito's certainty, then presumably that object is the source of what produces the reflecting consciousness of the Cartesian cogito. And there are two options for the type of object this could be:
36 Cf. the following claim in Being and Nothingness: "I believe that I have demonstrated that the first condition of all reflection is a pre-reflective cogito" (121/116 f.). Zheng suggests that nonpositional consciousness grounds pure reflection (2001, 35) , but he elaborates neither on why nonpositional consciousness, as opposed to something else, is what gives pure reflection its certainty nor on how it does so. 37 Sartre in fact suggests at one point that "before any interpretation", i. e. before any philosophical theorizing, "I encounter nonthetic consciousness in myself" (CSKS 139 f.). This suggests that he thinks no argument is needed for nonthetic consciousness. But there are two reasons against such a reading. First, Sartre's point in this claim can be construed as asserting only that the doctrine of nonthetic consciousness is true whether or not one recognizes it in one's theory: everyone in some sense "encounters" nonthetic consciousness even if one's theorizing fails to account for it. Second, the claim doesn't mean that one can't provide an argument for the thesis of nonthetic consciousness. Although the phenomenological method takes intuition, rather than demonstration or reasoning, as the standard of truth, arguments are not thereby altogether disallowed. Accordingly, we can understand an argument for the thesis of nonthetic consciousness as something that helps one to intuit better the nonthetic nature of consciousness.
(IA) an object internal to consciousness; or, (IB) an object external to consciousness.
As we shall see, (IA) has a representative in Husserl's transcendental ego, whereas (IB) has one in the Freudian unconscious. However, if what guarantees the Cartesian cogito's certainty is (II), consciousness, then that consciousness must be either (IIA) consciousness internal to the reflected consciousness within the Cartesian cogito; or, (IIB) consciousness external to the reflected consciousness within the Cartesian cogito (e. g. a reflecting consciousness).
We can see these options outlined in the following diagram: Within Sartre's texts, we can find arguments that explicitly challenge alternatives (IA), (IB), and (IIB) insofar as they are supposed to account for the Cartesian cogito's certainty. If those are sound arguments, then we would be left with (IIA). In other words, the Cartesian cogito's certainty is grounded on the nonthetic consciousness of the reflected consciousness. Accordingly, Sartre often calls nonthetic consciousness the "pre-reflective cogito". I suggest that he gives it this appellation when he wants to underscore nonthetic consciousness's role in grounding the Cartesian cogito's certainty.38 We can present Sartre's argument schematically as follows:
38 Levinas had already suggested that the Cartesian cogito might be grounded on "the being of consciousness", which he had already described as being "absolute" and as being "constantly present to itself" (TIHP 30):
(1) It is essential to every consciousness that it can perform the Cartesian cogito. The heavy-lifting of the above argument occurs in the various subarguments required to support (4). I turn now to these subarguments.
Sartre's Rejection of (IA) and Husserl's Transcendental Ego
The first option to consider is (IA), that the Cartesian cogito's certainty is grounded on an object internal to consciousness. Sartre treats Husserl's transcendental ego as the prime representative of this sort of view.39 We can set aside here whether [C] onsciousness presents itself as a sphere of absolute existence. This absolute existence not only expresses the indubitable character of the cogito but also, qua positive determination of the very being of consciousness, founds the possibility of an indubitable cogito. (TIHP 30 f.) Levinas goes on to state:
It is in this, we believe, that Husserl's conception of the cogito differs from Descartes's.
(TIHP 31; cf. TE 42/25) If the reader has been following this paper's footnotes, there is clearly a further story to be told, lying outside the scope of this paper, concerning Levinas's influence on Sartre's thought. 39 Sartre draws his interpretation of Husserl primarily from Ideen I, Zeitbewusstsein, Formale und Transzendentale Logik, and Cartesianische Meditationen. He also shows familiarity with the earlier Logische Untersuchungen, which he regards as having a more consistent phenomenological view of the ego. There are several accounts in the secondary literature of Sartre's rejection of Husserl's transcendental ego, including Coorebyter 2000, 179-187; Gardner 2009, 11-13; Gurwitsch 1941 , Priest 2000 , Renaudie 2013 , Stawarska 2002 , Weimin 2007 , and Williford 2011 . My account here focuses on Sartre's rejection of the transcendental ego as being that which accounts for the Cartesian cogito's certainty. These other interpretations focus on Sartre's other arguments against the transcendental ego.
Sartre's interpretation of Husserl is correct.40 It suffices to recognize, first, that Sartre understands Husserl's transcendental ego as an object internal to consciousness, and, second, that some of Sartre's arguments against it would likely apply to any attempt to ground the Cartesian cogito's certainty on an object internal to consciousness. So, what is Husserl's transcendental ego?41 Sartre describes it as "behind each consciousness" and as performing two functions (TE 37 f./20 f.). First, it constitutes intentional objects for consciousness out of the matter given to it, specifically insofar as it provides "unity", i. e. unites one's experience into an intelligible whole. Second, it provides "individuality", i. e. it accounts for what individuates or makes for different personal subjects. Sartre rejects that the transcendental ego needs to be appealed to in order to account for either unity or individuality . But for my purposes, we should look at how he further characterizes Husserl's transcendental ego.
Whether correctly or not, Sartre thinks Husserl is further committed to treating the transcendental ego both as substantial (TE 42/25, 50/34) and as a part of every consciousness (TE 52/36).42 That is, it would be an object within consciousness that is an intentional object of every consciousness. Hence, setting aside 40 This is a very intriguing question, especially given that Sartre's first major encounter with Husserl's thought was Emmanuel Levinas's The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology. That work usually treats Husserl's pure ego as non-substantial. See TIHP 27, 41 f., and 51. Such passages suggest that Sartre came to interpret Husserl differently from Levinas. Nevertheless, there are other passages in Levinas's book that could have suggested to Sartre such a substantialist reading of the pure ego and its relation to the cogito, i. e. a reading that would treat the ego as a persisting thing, rather than as a process, in which properties inhere: both the potential cogito and the actual cogito are "consciousness of something" (TIHP 46, my emphasis) In Ideen […] the ego [le moi] appears as an irreducible element of conscious life. Acts originate, so to speak, from the ego which lives in these acts. (TIHP 50) 41 I follow Sartre in treating "the I" as equivalent to "transcendental ego" (TE 50). 42 There are at least three passages in Husserl's Ideen I that might have suggested this reading to Sartre: (1) the Ego "lives in" all experiences ( § 34); (2) the Ego "can […] never be absent" ( § 37); and, (3) a nullification of the world leaves absolute consciousness as a residuum ( § 49; cf. Levinas's rejection of this section of the Ideen, TIHP 48-50). Furthermore, Sartre suggests that the Cartesian Meditations are most exemplary of Husserl's new view of the ego (TE 42). Sartre perhaps had passages such as the following four in mind:
(1) "The ego is itself existent for itself in continuous evidence; thus, in itself, it is continuously constituting itself as existing" ( § 31); (2) "the identical ego […] lives in all Erlebnisse of consciousness" ( § 31); the other functions and properties attributed to it, Husserl's transcendental ego matches (IA). Furthermore, it could be appealed to as follows for explaining the Cartesian cogito's certainty: if the transcendental ego is a constituent of every consciousness, it would be shared in common between the two consciousnesses of the Cartesian cogito, both the reflecting and the reflected consciousness. And in virtue of being shared in common by both of them, it might be what provides the indissoluble unity that binds the two, thereby giving the Cartesian cogito its certainty.
Sartre raises many objections to Husserl's transcendental ego, but three are relevant to the attempt to ground the Cartesian cogito's certainty on an object internal to consciousness. First, Sartre claims that phenomenological inspection shows that the transcendental ego is not immanent to consciousness. For example, when I read, I am conscious of what I am reading, but there need not be any I that "inhabits" consciousness (TE 46 f./30).43 And if the transcendental ego does not inhabit every unreflective or pre-reflective consciousness, then the transcendental ego would not straightforwardly be shared in common between consciousnesses. This would make necessary a further account for how the Cartesian cogito could be performed with respect to every unreflective consciousness.
The second objection presents a stronger challenge against an appeal to the transcendental ego for explaining the Cartesian cogito's certainty. Namely, the objection is that even if phenomenological inspection revealed an ever-present "I", an appeal to the transcendental ego would be inconsistent with proper phenomenological method. If so, it shouldn't be appealed to within acceptable phenomenological descriptions or explanations of the Cartesian cogito's certainty. In brief, this is because the transcendental ego is supposed to be a transcendent object, but a proper phenomenological method would bracket the existence of all such objects. Sartre writes:
I quite recognize that Husserl grants to the I [Je, which Sartre treats here as interchangeable with the transcendental ego] a special transcendence which is not the transcendence of the object, and which one could call a transcendence "from above". But by what right [droit]? (TE 50/34) (3) the ego is "not an empty pole of identity" but rather an "identical substrate of ego-properties" ( § 32); and, (4) "I am for me myself and to me continually given through experiential evidence as 'I myself'. This is valid for the transcendental ego and, in every sense of 'ego'." ( § 33) (I have slightly modified Cairns's translations.) Levinas focuses almost exclusively on Ideen I, so Sartre's recognition of these passages from the Cartesian Meditations might explain why he interprets Husserl somewhat differently from Levinas. 43 Cf. CSKS 123.
The "special transcendence" accorded to the transcendental ego is what Husserl describes as "a quite peculiar transcendence", "a non-constituted transcendence", and "a transcendence in immanence".44 And due to its special form of transcendence, Husserl goes on to assert that "we should not be free to suspend it".45
Husserl's motivation for treating the transcendental ego as having a special form of transcendence is that he wants to posit the transcendental ego's existence even after the existence of all other transcendent objects is bracketed with the "phenomenological reduction".46 But Sartre rejects this as ungrounded: "Let us be more radical and assert without fear that all transcendence must fall under the ἐποχή", i. e. we ought to bracket the existence of everything transcendent, including the I (TE 51/34).47 Hence, when adhering to a proper phenomenological method, we ought not to appeal to the transcendental ego to explain the Cartesian cogito's certainty.
Sartre's third objection is stronger yet: even if the results of phenomenological inspection were different, and even if there were no methodological problem in positing the transcendental ego, the transcendental ego still could not explain the Cartesian cogito's certainty. This objection can be understood only if we first understand how Sartre distinguishes the mental operations of perception and conception, drawing on Sartre's most explicit characterization of them in The Imaginary .
In perception, we are not presented with objects all at once; rather, we are presented with profiles on those objects, which profiles are apprehended as making promises about the object's further profiles that could be apprehended. For example, when I perceive a cube, I apprehend only a part of it, e. g. at most three sides of it. Furthermore, I apprehend the three sides as a cube insofar as I take them to make promises that further acts of perception will reveal that the object has the features necessary for being a cube, e. g. being six-sided. But since such promises could fail to be kept, this makes perception uncertain. In contrast, in conception we are presented with an object all at once without profiles. Hence, since there are no further appearances to be met with beyond what is appre- hended by means of conception, an object that is conceived does not make any promises at all, and a fortiori there is no risk of the promises' failing to be kept. Thus, conception guarantees certainty.48
With this distinction in place, let us return to Sartre's third objection in Transcendence of the Ego. This objection stems from Sartre's agreement with Husserl that the Cartesian cogito's certainty "comes from apprehending consciousness without facets, without profiles, completely (without Abschattungen)" (TE 49/33). In Sartre's terminology from The Imaginary, the Cartesian cogito has certainty in virtue of the reflected consciousness being conceived. But unlike consciousness, Sartre charges that the transcendental ego is not conceived, and so cannot be posited with certainty. This is encapsulated by Sartre's claim that "it is only too certain that the I of the I Think is an object grasped with neither apodictic nor adequate evidence" (TE 51/35).
Sartre supports this charge with the claim that "by saying I we affirm far more than we know" (TE 51/35). At first, this appears to be a bald assertion. Sartre grants that the I is apprehended as "the source of consciousness", but he thinks that this apprehension, although natural, "should make us pause": "for this very reason the I appears veiled, indistinct through consciousness, like a pebble at the bottom of the water" (TE 51 f./35). Unfortunately, Sartre's point here is not spelled out. But I suggest that the thought here is that if we view each consciousness as having the I as its source, then this is akin to treating each consciousness as a profile (Abschattung) of the I. If that is so, then the I is not grasped "all at once" and "without profile"; rather, it must be learned about by attending to its various profiles. In other words, in apprehending the I as a source of consciousness, we do not conceive it but rather perceive it. And since it is not conceived, it is not grasped with apodictic evidence. 49 Sartre argues further that even if the I is not treated as a source of consciousness, it still cannot be an object grasped with apodictic evidence. He claims that "if the I is a part of consciousness, there would be two I's: the I of the reflective [réflexive] consciousness and the I of the reflected [réfléchie] consciousness" (TE 52/36). We can understand this claim as follows. Suppose we were to take the transcendental ego as a part of every consciousness, and so as a part of both the reflecting and the reflected consciousness of the Cartesian cogito. It can then be rightly said that both the reflecting and the reflected consciousness each have an I as an intentional object. But it would be too hasty to conclude that the I of the one consciousness is identical with the I of the other. As Sartre puts it:
For it is inadmissible that any communication could be established between the reflective I and the reflected I if they are real elements of consciousness; above all, it is inadmissible that they may finally achieve identity in one unique I. (TE 52/36) Unfortunately, Sartre doesn't elaborate on why this inference would be too hasty. I suggest that it is because the I is understood here as the transcendental ego, and hence as a substantial object. In virtue of its being a substantial object, we would have to learn about it in the same way as any object of perception. It would be up to further investigation to determine whether the reflecting I and the reflected I are the same. But this makes such an investigation, akin to perception as described in The Imaginary, uncertain and merely probable.
Given these three objections, Sartre finds the appeal to the transcendental ego unsatisfactory for explaining the Cartesian cogito's certainty. Likewise, since Sartre's arguments here rely on a minimal characterization of the transcendental ego -namely, as an object internal to consciousness -it seems that these arguments could apply, perhaps with some modifications, to any other object internal to consciousness. Thus, these objections to Husserl's transcendental ego would apply to any other account along the lines of (IA).
Sartre's Rejection of (IB) and the Freudian Unconscious
A second option for explaining what grounds the Cartesian cogito's certainty is an appeal to an object external to consciousness that would be the source of the apodicticity of the Cartesian cogito. Sartre's prime exemplar of this approach is the positing of the Freudian unconscious as responsible for the reflective act that unites the two consciousnesses within the Cartesian cogito. Sartre's attack against this approach occurs in both Transcendence of the Ego (98/78 f.) and The Emotions: Outline of a Theory (45 f.). In this subsection, I present Sartre's argument against the Freudian view as he understands it. In Section 6, I shall consider whether Sartre's attack on this one representative of (IB) suffices to rule out alternative views along the lines of (IB).
Sartre holds that although the psychoanalysts have the correct intuition that "consciousness does not 'come out' of the I" -i. e. that there is no transcendental ego from which conscious acts spring -they provide "a coarse and materialistic interpretation of [this] correct intuition" (TE 98/78). Since they "could not accept the idea of a spontaneity producing itself" (TE 98/78) -i. e. they could not accept Sartre's view that "all consciousness is consciousness through and through" (IY 12) -they "naively imagined that the spontaneous consciousnesses 'came out' of the unconscious where they already existed" (TE 98/79). This helps us see what Sartre takes the unconscious to be. Like the transcendental ego, it is a substance that is the source of consciousness, but unlike the transcendental ego, it is external, rather than internal, to every consciousness. Moreover, unlike the transcendental ego or consciousness, Sartre claims that the unconscious has a "passive existence" (TE 98/79) . This is presumably because the unconscious is supposed to be something material that operates by means of a "bond of causality" (EM 48), and as such it is appealed to in materialist scientific explanations.
But like the transcendental ego, Sartre rejects the unconscious as an explanation for the Cartesian cogito's certainty. This is because, he thinks, we cannot believe that the unconscious "contains spontaneities of a reflected sort" (TE 57/41). That is, Sartre thinks that it cannot really be a source of any reflection, let alone that of the Cartesian cogito. His reason is that the unconscious is supposed to be something passive whereas reflection is something spontaneous.50 Since the unconscious is supposed to have a passive existence "like a stone or a cart", "it is necessary [for the psychoanalyst] to renounce entirely the Cartesian cogito" (E 46). Accordingly, to understand why the unconscious cannot account for the Cartesian cogito's certainty, we need an understanding of Sartre's conceptions of spontaneity and passivity.
Unfortunately, Sartre never clearly explains what he means by these notions. I offer the following three suggestions. First, spontaneity is a broader notion than freedom, for it can be applied not only to actions but also to judgments, acts of constitution, and so on.51 Second, something spontaneous, unlike something passive, is not determined by laws of cause and effect. Third, whereas the realm of passivity is governed by laws of cause and effect, the realm of spontaneity is one of meaning. For Sartre seems to take meanings as something that can be grasped only by something spontaneous. Presumably this is because meanings are normative.
Let me explain this last suggestion. To recognize something as having a particular meaning, one must recognize the criteria required for something to have that meaning. For example, in a perceptual apprehension of three sides as a cube, I treat those sides as having the meaning "cube". And I can apprehend the three sides as a cube only by recognizing the various criteria for something's being a cube, e. g. having six sides, each of which is a square of the same size as the others. To recognize such criteria is to recognize how they could be applied correctly or incorrectly. But according to Sartre a being that is merely passive and subject to laws of cause and effect cannot recognize this normativity of meaning. Rather, only something spontaneous, i. e. something that can freely use and evaluate normative criteria, can grasp meanings.
This third suggestion gives us reason to think that only something spontaneous can genuinely perform the Cartesian cogito.52 To see how this is so, let us consider in turn both the reflecting and the reflected consciousness. In our example, the reflected consciousness is "there's a tree". Since this consciousness grasps something as instantiating the meaning "tree", it must be spontaneous. But the reflecting consciousness too must be spontaneous, whether that consciousness reflects "I perceive there's a tree" or "I imagine there's a tree". First, the reflecting consciousness must grasp the reflected consciousness as consciousness. Second, it must grasp what it means "to perceive" or "to imagine". And third, it must, just like the reflected consciousness, grasp the meaning "tree". Therefore, whatever provides the indissoluble unity for the Cartesian cogito's certainty must ensure that the reflecting consciousness is spontaneous.
But positing the unconscious as responsible for reflection cannot account for the spontaneous nature of the reflecting consciousness. Since the unconscious is supposed to be a material substance lying outside consciousness, it must operate causally.53 Thus, if it is responsible for reflection, then it is a cause with the reflecting consciousness as its effect. According to Sartre, this "is to admit that consciousness is established as a signification without being conscious of the signification which it establishes", thereby making it "necessary to renounce entirely the Cartesian cogito" (EM 46). This is because the unconscious, as something passive and material, operates only in terms of cause and effect, so that whatever it causes likewise must be passive and material. So if the unconscious produces the reflecting consciousness of the Cartesian cogito, such a reflecting consciousness would be passive and material. Thus, it would not be able to grasp any meanings.54 And if it does not grasp any meanings, it doesn't correctly grasp the meanings required for the reflected consciousness, let alone grasp them with certainty. Thus, the unconscious cannot guarantee the Cartesian cogito's certainty.
52 Cf. EM 45-48. 53 Sartre also describes the unconscious as something that, were it to exist, would, like other material things, be "subject to the principle of inertia" (CSKS 138). 54 For another case where Sartre discusses the unconscious's inability to grasp meanings, see CSKS 125.
This rules out one representative of (IB), but it is not so clear that all views along the lines of (IB) would be subject to Sartre's attack on the Freudian unconscious. I will take up this issue in Section 6.
Why (IIB) Fails to Explain the Cartesian Cogito's Certainty
So far, we have considered Sartre's arguments against (IA) and (IB), each of which appeals to an object to account for the apodicticity of the Cartesian cogito. Now let us consider (IIB), one of two options that appeals instead to consciousness itself. This option holds, namely, that the Cartesian cogito's certainty is guaranteed by a consciousness external to the reflected consciousness of the Cartesian cogito. It seems that this external consciousness could just be the Cartesian cogito's reflecting consciousness. But recall from Subsection 3.2 that an appeal to the nature of reflection does not work because some acts of reflection are impure.
Since the Cartesian cogito's certainty cannot be explained merely by its reflective nature, we might try to explain its certainty by appealing to yet another consciousness external to the Cartesian cogito. This option can be dispensed with quite easily. For it seems the only candidate that could do the job would be another reflecting consciousness. But this just raises the same problem over again, since we now have three distinct consciousnesses that need to be united to guarantee certainty. This account clearly leads to an infinite regress that doesn't answer our original question. Thus, if we are to explain the Cartesian cogito's certainty, we have to look to some account other than (IIB).
Sartre's Solution: (IIA)
We have just seen how Sartre has the resources to reject three of the four options for explaining the Cartesian cogito's certainty. Let us review.
Option (IA) appealed to something internal to consciousness, the main representative of which is Husserl's transcendental ego. This was unsatisfactory for three reasons. First, neither an ego nor any other object is present within every conscious experience. Second, even if an ego or other object were present within every consciousness, a proper phenomenology brackets the existence of all objects, including the transcendental ego. Third, even if the above problems were overcome, the transcendental ego would not guarantee the Cartesian cogito's certainty because there is no apodictic evidence that the I of one consciousness is identical to the I of another consciousness.
Option (IB) appealed to something external to consciousness, the main representative of which is the Freudian unconscious. This option failed because the reflecting consciousness of the Cartesian cogito must be capable of correctly grasping meanings. Yet any passive object external to consciousness, including the Freudian unconscious, cannot produce something that grasps meaning. So it cannot produce the reflecting consciousness of the Cartesian cogito, and thereby it fails to account for the Cartesian cogito's certainty.
Option (IIB) held that the Cartesian cogito's certainty is grounded on a consciousness distinct from the reflected consciousness within the Cartesian cogito. This option failed, first, because the existence of impure reflection means that mere reflection cannot guarantee any certainty. But this option could not then be saved by appealing to a third consciousness to join the reflecting and the reflected consciousness; for that only pushes the explanatory question back.
In ruling out these options, Sartre is left with appealing to (IIA), and hence to one of the distinctive doctrines of his phenomenological ontology: that all consciousness is nonthetically aware of itself. In the next section, we will evaluate the soundness of Sartre's argument. But now it is necessary to note that the argument presented so far shows, if sound, only that nonthetic consciousness must be what grounds the Cartesian cogito's certainty. Further explanation or argumentation is required to show how it does so. I suggest now a rough account of such a further explanation.
Sartre's descriptions of nonthetic consciousness give the impression that each single consciousness is nonthetically aware of itself. Yet this impression is misleading because of Sartre's program -beginning in the chapter "Immediate Structures of the For-Itself" in Being and Nothingness -to reject the view that consciousness is "instantaneous". This includes the cogito, as he states that "the cogito refuses instantaneity" by means of "a temporal surpassing" (158/149).55 In rejecting the conception of consciousness as instantaneous, Sartre rejects understanding consciousness in terms of temporally discrete acts.56 Rather, as Sartre cryptically states, " [t] emporality is the being of the For-itself in so far as the For-itself has to 55 For remarks concerning instantaneity in "Immediate Structures", see 120/116, 133/127, 147 f./139 f. For remarks in the chapter "Temporality", see 162/152 f., 179/168, 188 f./176, 192-195/179-182, 209-211/194-196 . For later remarks in Being and Nothingness, see 595 f./540 f., 599/544. 56 Earlier in Being and Nothingness, Sartre often describes consciousness and the cogito as instantaneous (84/83, 85/84) . Sartre is thus revising or refining his views of consciousness and the cogito. In addition to the passages cited in the previous footnote, Sartre offers an uncharacteristically lucid account of why the Cartesian cogito "must not be limited to the infinitesimal instant" (BN 219 f./202 f.). Cf. Beauvoir's clarification of this point in MPPS 31 f. be its being ecstatically" and "the For-itself cannot be except in temporal form" (BN 195/182) . Setting aside the admittedly obscure details of Sartre's theory of temporality, I wish here only to suggest that his rejection of the instantaneity of consciousness allows him to claim that, since consciousness is not to be understood in terms of temporally discrete acts, the reflecting consciousness and the reflected consciousness can share in common a nonthetic consciousness. Hence, although I claimed earlier that Sartre endorses (IIA) as an answer to the Cartesian cogito's certainty, we must be careful to distinguish two ways of reading (IIA):57 (IIAi) reflected consciousness is instantaneous (i. e. is not intrinsically related to preceding or following consciousnesses); or, (IIAii) reflected consciousness is enduring or temporalizes itself (i. e. is intrinsically related to preceding and following consciousnesses).
If we take into account Sartre's remarks on temporality, his view must not be taken to be (IIAi) but rather (IIAii). We can accordingly flesh out the diagram given earlier: Accordingly, Sartre holds that (IIAii) explains the Cartesian cogito's certainty. Although he doesn't spell out how exactly this is supposed to work, I suggest briefly one way he might elaborate. Nonthetic consciousness is not a discrete or distinct act in time separate from acts of thetic consciousness. Rather, it is common to various thetic apprehensions of objects, and it is an awareness of a shared point of view held in common by them. Hence, with respect to the Cartesian cogito, there is only one nonthetic consciousness that is shared by both the reflecting and the reflected consciousnesses.58 Since the reflected consciousness is both spontaneous and aware of itself nonthetically prior to any act of reflection, it itself can be the source of acts of reflection.59 And in virtue of the sharing of nonthetic consciousness between the reflecting and reflected consciousness, such reflection will have the Cartesian cogito's certainty.
Nonthetic consciousness thus answers the methodological need for a firm foundation of Sartre's phenomenological-ontological reflections. It seems that even his later philosophical reflections find their methodological basis in nonthetic consciousness.60 But even if the above is a satisfactory account of the Cartesian cogito's certainty, we can still ask how exactly nonthetic consciousness gives certainty to pure reflection more generally. Before outlining an answer to this question, let us first evaluate the argument so far.
Evaluation of Sartre's Argument
Despite the quite complicated nature of the above argument, recall the apparently unsupported assertion in Being and Nothingness that "there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito" (13/20). As far as I can tell, the only passages that directly support this claim are those to which I have appealed in the previous section.
In evaluating Sartre's argument as I have presented it, there are two questions to consider. First, does the argument convincingly show that the alternative explanations are unsatisfactory? Second, is this a persuasive argument for showing 58 Presumably in virtue of this, Sartre claims that the reflecting and reflected consciousnesses are not "two separate, thing-like consciousnesses" (CSKS 134). 59 Cf. Sartre's claim that "in some sense the unreflected consciousness produces reflective consciousness as a recovery of itself" (CSKS 142; cf. 133) . 60 See the following mentions of nonthetic consciousness: CDR 51 and footnote to SM 32 f. See the following for a discussion of the cogito: SB 92-94, 102-105. And finally, see MS 10-16 for a discussion of a problem reminiscent of that of pure reflection.
that nonthetic consciousness is a sound methodological basis for Sartre's phenomenological ontology? In what follows, I address these questions together. For, as we shall see, Sartre relies on contentious assumptions in rejecting the alternative views, and a recognition of these assumptions reveals potential problems with the argument's capacity to lay down a firm methodological basis.
I begin by stating some of the most contentious assumptions of Sartre's argument: (A1) It is essential to every consciousness that it can perform the Cartesian cogito. (A2) Consciousness is spontaneous. [appealed to in rejecting (IB)] (A3) An object external to consciousness must have a passive existence.
[appealed to in rejecting (IB)] (A4) Something that operates in terms of cause and effect cannot be sensitive to normativity and so cannot grasp meanings. [appealed to in rejecting (IB)] (A5) Something that operates in terms of cause and effect cannot produce something else that is sensitive to normativity and thereby grasp meanings.
[appealed to rejecting (IB)]
There are many ways in which one could reject (A1),61 and I neither can nor want to defend that assumption here. Rather, I just want to note that this assumption is both foundational to Sartre's thought and understandable within his historical context.62 Similar considerations apply to (A2).63 Likewise, there are many other assumptions made in Sartre's arguments against Husserl's transcendental ego, but I have not listed them above because they largely stem from Sartre's acceptance and interpretation of Husserl's own phenomenological method. Sartre's assumption and use of (A3)-(A5) are more troubling for two reasons. First, he uses these assumptions to argue against the Freudian unconscious's ability to account for the Cartesian cogito's certainty. As I have presented it, the Freudian unconscious is Sartre's prime exemplar of (IB). But other accounts fitting (IB) are possible. For example, consider an account that posits an object outside of consciousness that -unlike the Freudian unconscious as Sartre understands it -is not passive. Such an account would not be subject to the objection pre-61 Many -often inspired by Heidegger -have taken Sartre to task for (A1), as they think this Cartesianism was something that ought to have been dismissed long ago. sented in Subsection 5.2 of this paper. So, perhaps Sartre's argument has a lacuna insofar as it does not offer reasons against all the possible variations of (IB).
The second problem with (A3)-(A5) is that these assumptions seem to be grounded on his dualist ontology of being-in-itself and being-for-itself. According to this ontology as presented in Being and Nothingness, being-in-itself is inert, external to consciousness, and cannot act upon consciousness. In contrast, being-for-itself is spontaneous and can grasp meanings. Thus, it seems that (A3)-(A5) are grounded on Sartre's dualist ontology. But this seems problematic if Sartre's argument is supposed to establish a solid methodological basis for his phenomenological ontology. For it thus seems that Sartre is arguing in a circle: he justifies his philosophical method by relying on ontological claims whose only justification is given through the use of that very same philosophical method.
There are at least three ways that Sartre might respond. First, since the primary worries raised above concern the unconscious, Sartre could appeal to his other objections to the unconscious. Nevertheless, this response would be successful only if Sartre's other arguments against the unconscious don't rely on ontological claims. But that is doubtful.
Second, he might just appeal to the general approach of phenomenology, setting aside his specific methodological basis in nonthetic consciousness. He could then either posit that the unconscious is inconsistent with that general approach or take up that approach and then bracket the existence of the unconscious. In fact, the Introduction to Being and Nothingness seems to take the former tack: recall that Sartre's transcendental argument from knowledge relied on the assumption of the absurdity of the unconscious. But in any case, this second response would not be persuasive to someone not already committed to phenomenology.
Neither of these responses seems all that satisfactory. So, it seems that Sartre just has firm ontological commitments to ruling out the unconscious and to assuming (A3)-(A5). And it still appears that Sartre is saddled with offering a circular argument for establishing the methodological basis of his phenomenological ontology. But perhaps this circularity is not vicious. For although Husserl is adamant that phenomenology is supposed to be a presuppositionless science,64 Sartre nowhere -as far as I can tell -asserts any such claim. I suggest, then, that although Sartre sees the cogito as the proper methodological basis of philosophical reflection, he is nevertheless not a foundationalist, but rather a coherentist, when it comes to constructing a philosophical system. One indication of this is that Sartre waits until Part Two of Being and Nothingness to take the cogito as a starting point. Whether this is really a viable approach requires a deeper understanding of Sartre's method, specifically how nonthetic consciousness is supposed to ground pure reflection. I conclude in the next section by offering some preliminary suggestions based on the above interpretation.
Concluding Suggestions about Pure Reflection
As we have seen, Sartre appeals to nonthetic consciousness to explain both the certainty of the Cartesian cogito and pure reflection. His further remarks about pure reflection -in the section "Original Temporality and Psychic Temporality: Reflection" in Being and Nothingness -are intended to explain the manner in which such certainties can be thetically formulated. Unfortunately, these remarks are brief and notoriously cryptic, even by Sartre's standards. But I conclude this paper by offering a few suggestions about how pure reflection might be grounded on nonthetic consciousness.
Early in "Original Temporality and Psychic Temporality: Reflection", Sartre states that "we are accustomed to represent reflection as a new consciousness", namely one (the reflecting consciousness) that takes another consciousness (the reflected consciousness) as its object (BN 212/197, my emphasis) . I suggest that Sartre holds that, although there is something correct about this view to which we are accustomed, we -including perhaps Sartre himself in his earlier writingsnevertheless need to revise our understanding of the nature of reflection.
If we held the customary view strictly -i. e. if we held that the reflecting consciousness is a new consciousness distinct from the reflected consciousnessthen there would be nothing to guarantee that the reflecting consciousness does not alter the reflected consciousness in such a way as to distort the nature of the latter. For Sartre himself asserts that reflection always alters its object (BN 121/116, 214/198) , and it was already noted above that impure reflection misconstrues the nature of consciousness. Sartre had earlier proposed, however, that the pre-reflective cogito of the reflected consciousness is "homologous with the reflective cogito" (BN 121/117).
Sartre doesn't elaborate on this remark, but I suggest that he rejects the customary view because of his rejection of the conception of consciousness as instantaneous, as was explained briefly in Section 5. Thus, the reflecting consciousness is not an entirely new consciousness, for it shares a common nonthetic consciousness with the reflected consciousness. In the remainder of the paper, I want to suggest how an appreciation of this view can shed some light on how pure reflection is grounded on nonthetic consciousness. Both pure and impure reflection ought to be characterized as sharing a nonthetic consciousness with the reflected consciousness. This is because Sartre holds that pure reflection is the original form of even impure reflection. Impure reflection goes astray simply by asserting claims beyond what is warranted by pure reflection.65 The difference between the two, I suggest, is the manner, perspective, or attitude in which nonthetic consciousness is conscious of the reflected consciousness.
Namely, in impure reflection, the reflected consciousness is treated as a profile of or point of view on an object, namely the psyche. In this way, the reflected consciousness becomes something like a perceptual object, that makes promises or claims about the psyche, which promises or claims can fail to be kept. That is why impure reflection can issue false claims.66 In contrast, pure reflection doesn't treat the reflected consciousness as a profile of or perspective on some object. Rather, pure reflection treats the reflected consciousness as an object of conception, an object that issues no promises or claims about future profiles. What then is conceived? Namely, it is the being of consciousness -something that is what it is not and that is not what it is -but apprehended as existing in a determinate way for some interval of time.
In other words, the nonthetic consciousness of pure reflection is purely and simply aware of itself as free but also as situated. The nonthetic consciousness of impure reflection is likewise aware of itself as free within a situation, but it differs from that of pure reflection because it also apprehends itself either as not being free or as not being situated. Hence, these additional claims of impure reflection amount to bad faith (see BN 225/208). The catharsis needed for pure reflection, then, requires that one purify one's consciousness by no longer taking oneself as either unfree or unsituated. Since this catharsis is founded upon a nonthetic apprehension, it is not something that can be produced by simply reading another's (i. e. Sartre's) philosophical reflections. Rather, this nonthetic consciousness can only come from one's own consciousness. This explains, perhaps, Sartre's reluctance to describe what this catharsis is.
This admittedly sketchy account of pure and impure reflection sheds some light on how reflection in general, including both its pure and impure forms, comes about. It is clear that, although nonthetic consciousness is necessary for 65 Since Sartre almost equates pure reflection with authenticity, this claim might lead one to think that everyone is "originally authentic". But that is incorrect. Pure reflection is the "original form" of all reflection not in a temporal sense, but rather in the sense that it characterizes the basic ontological structure of all reflection. 66 reflection, it is not on its own sufficient for producing reflection; for although all consciousness is nonthetic, not all consciousness is reflective. So, further conditions have to be met. With respect to impure reflection, Sartre states that the motivation to be a for-itself-in-itself (of a particular sort) is a further condition that brings about impure reflection . In contrast, Sartre states in Being and Nothingness that it is the improper place to identify and explain the motivation for pure reflection (BN 224/207; cf. TE 92) .67 Behind this reluctance, I suggest, is Sartre's insistence on human freedom together with the view that the "quasi-object" of pure reflection is the for-itself, which is a free process. The only thing that could prompt consciousness to pure reflection, instead of impure reflection, is freedom itself. But we should be wary of stating any conditions or motivations that would prompt freedom to pure reflection, simply because we would then be liable to misconstruing the nature of freedom.68
Even if this answer gets him off the hook for giving a discursive explanation of pure reflection, there are legitimate questions to be asked concerning Sartre's method. For example, how can we discriminate between reflections that are pure and those that are impure? More specifically, how can we trust that Sartre's remarks in Being and Nothingness are instances of pure reflection? And even if Sartre cannot offer a discursive account of how pure reflection comes about, can he successfully provide some other sort of account, e. g. by illustrating radical conversions in fictional works or by carrying out existential psychoanalyses? Finally, how does Sartre reconcile his rejection of the instantaneous conception of consciousness with his claim that "the instant" will be "produced in the case of a radical modification of our fundamental project", i. e. in the case of a radical conversion (BN 600/544)? I suggest that further work on nonthetic consciousness and its relationship to reflection might shed light on such questions. But perhaps not, as even Sartre himself soon saw the need to rethink his philosophical method.69 67 See NE 470-498 for something like an attempt to carry out these tasks. 68 This reasoning might seem to apply to impure reflection as well. But that is incorrect: although impure reflection is still based on freedom in a sense (since all consciousness is free), its motivation comes from a logically and temporally prior free choice: the original project to be a particular in-itself-for-itself. In contrast, since pure reflection is supposed to reveal freedom as such, it can only be based on a free choice that cannot be explained. 69 Consider not only Search for a Method but also, for example, the following remark from Notebooks for an Ethics: "the dialectic is until now the only method available for making sense of freedom, for rendering it intelligible, and for at the same time preserving its creative aspect" (NE 466 
